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ILLINOIS SAVINGS AND LOAN FACILITIES:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO BRANCHING
Branching by savings and loan associations has grown hand-inhand with the rise of these institutions to the status of the nation's second largest financial intermediary. ' While the past decade in particular
has seen enormous growth in the use of branch operations, 2 Illinois has
maintained a prohibition against branching by state-chartered associations.3 Essentially, a branch is a separate and complete banking or savings and loan establishment conducting general banking business in a
location apart from a main office of a bank or savings and loan. 4 While
the branch represents a separate physical entity, it is not a separate legal entity. 5 It is instead the operation of one banking institution as the
instrumentality of another, in which the relationship between them is
6
such that they operate as a single unit.
On its face, branching would appear to be a beneficial operation
for all concerned. Theoretically, it provides the savings and loan customer with a more convenient location at which to transact savings and
loan business. At the same time, it provides the savings and loan assoI. Gross savings receipts of all operating associations increased from $125.9 billion in 1974
to $218.3 billion in 1977. Total loans closed increased from $38.9 billion to $107.4 billion between
1974 and 1977. Zabrenski, S & L Branching.A Decade of Change, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J.
at 38, 40 (August 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the August FHLBB Journal]. Accompanying
this enormous growth during the 1970's, the number of branches has similarly increased dramatically from 7,197 in 1967 to 16,439 in 1977. Id. at 14.
2. The sharp increase in branches of savings and loan associations led one economist of the
Office of Economic Research of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to label the last decade "the
age of branching." Id. at 13.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). All references to Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 32, sections 701-944, in this note are to provisions of the Illinois Savings and Loan Act. The
legislative history of the Illinois Savings and Loan Act is considered in detail in the text accompanying notes 28-34 and 48-50 infra. The Act applies to state savings and loan associations formed
under and subject to the rules of the Act. In contrast to these state associations are federal savings
and loan associations. A federal association is defined as a "savings and loan association incorporated under the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, [12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976)] as now or
hereafter amended, whose principal business office is located within this State." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 32, § 710.07 (1977).
4. State Bank Bd. v. Bank of Okla., 409 F. Supp. 71, 90 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
5. Application of Summit & Elizabeth Trust Co., III N.J. Super. 154, 268 A.2d 21, 26
(1970). A branch is operated by the legal entity which operates the main savings and loan office.
As such, it has no separate board of directors or capital structure. Its deposits are pooled with the
capital structure of the main office. Id.
6. In re Application for Formation of Cleveland Trust Co. of Lake County, 38 Ohio St. 2d
183, 311 N.E.2d 854, 859 (1974). In distinguishing between independent banks and branches, the
court adopted the "unitary operations test." Under this test, branching existed only where the
"branch" involved was doing business with and through the main banking office as one unit. Id.

748

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

ciation with access to new markets7 and access to additional savings
dollars. 8 However, in reality there has been considerable controversy
over branching, particularly as it relates to competition between associations. 9 Proponents of branching argue that in addition to providing better service to customers through more convenient locations,
branching can create greater competition among savings and loan associations in a given area, 10 thereby putting downward pressure on
prices. " Additionally, branching may permit savings and loan associations to enjoy certain economies of scale.' 2 To the extent associations
realize cost saving economies in relation to size, there is further downward pressure on prices.
Those opposed to branching foresee rising prices as a result of
branching. They contend that branching leads to a concentration of
financial facilities in a given area.' 3 As the number of institutions contracts, each association present in an area exerts a greater degree of
7. Savings and loan associations might establish locations at a considerable distance from
the main office which are closer to new residential areas, for instance, without upsetting the operations at the main office. In so doing, the association may attract customers who might not have
normally saved or borrowed from the main office.
8. See Comment, Lyons Savings and Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 656 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Comment]. Savings and loan associations have traditionally had two main services-savings deposits and home mortgage financing.
Id. at 667. It is, of course, access to savings dollars that permits savings and loan associations to
carry on the true profit-yielding operation of making loans.
9. Comment, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of
a "Branch Bank", 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 362, 384 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CBCT's and the McFadden Act]. See generaly Comment, supra note 8.
10. Comment, supra note 8, at 668-69.
11. Here, price refers to the cost of borrowing money, Ze., interest rates.
12. Economies of scale refers to lower average costs which arise as a firm increases its size.
R. HEILBRONER, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM at 109-10 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as
HEILBRONER. The existence of economies of scale can arise from the presence of any of a number
of factors:
(1) Certain costs may remain constant or fixed. As output is increased, these fixed
costs are distributed over a greater number of units and per unit costs are consequently
lowered. Id. at 109.
(2) "Purchasing economies," such as quantity discounts, may be obtained as a firm
increases its size. This also may serve to lower per unit costs.
(3) The firm may benefit from specialization of labor and capital.
(4) There tends to be a reduction in risk associated with large assets (i.e., stabilization of deposit flow). Brigham and Petit, Effects ofStructure on Performance in the Sapings and Loan Industry in 3 A STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 971, 1003

(I. Friend ed. 1969).
As costs are lowered, profits will increase. Increased profits can lead to further expansions in size,
thereby triggering greater profits. As the process is repeated, the firm can grow larger and larger
and become more dominant in the market. Thus, while economies of scale may reduce prices,
there is also the potential for a concentration of associations and the emergence of some institutions dominating the market. Comment, supra note 8, at 668.
13. "Opponents of branching argue that a fully developed branch banking system will tend
to concentrate resources in the hands of a few banks. This concentration is said to lead to a
" CBCT's and the McFadden Act, supra note 9, at 385.
decrease in general economic activity ..

NOTES AND COMMENTS

market power which can approach monopoly proportions.' 4 Where
monopoly practices exist, the monopolist is able to raise prices to artifi-

cially high levels, thereby reaping "monopoly profits."'

5

Additionally,

6
the monopolist association may be able to discriminate as to prices.'
Evidence exists that would tend to support the contentions of both the
pro-branching and anti-branching factions. Economies of scale have
been shown to exist for savings and loan associations.' 7 On the other
hand, there has been a definite contraction in the number of associations operating in Illinois since the rise of branching. 18
The present controversy has arisen out of the quest for new markets and increased savings dollars. The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board 9 urges associations to compete aggressively for a share of the
savings market and to accelerate their movement into new market areas. The FHLBB warns that associations can effectively compete with
other financial institutions only if they pursue a customer-oriented
branching policy. 20 "If associations do not have branch offices . . .
[t]hey will be at a competitive disadvantage in the growing struggle for
2
the savings dollar." '

14. A "pure" monopoly situation exists when a firm is the sole supplier in an industry.
Where there is a contraction in the number of savings and loan associations in a given market
area, such a monopoly situation can develop. W. SLOWS & R. BURTON, MICROECONOMics at 32046 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as MICROECONOMICS].
15. As the number of suppliers decreases, the availability of substitute goods and services
decreases. When substitutes become nonexistent, the monopolist can effectively set its own prices.
Since there is no one in the market who can compete with the monopolist as to price, the monopolist can set prices at any level that it desires. MICROECONoMIcs, supra note 14 at 320-46. As a
result, monopoly power imposes two burdens on society. It sells goods at a higher price than that
of a competitive firm, and its output is smaller than would be the case under competitive conditions. The consumer receives less and pays more for it. HEILBRONER, supra note 12, at 554.
16. Since, in a monopoly situation, the monopolist controls the market price, it can effectively
set different prices for different consumers. By discriminating in this manner, the monopolist can
affect the allocation of resources. In the context of a savings and loan, this means that the monopoly association can determine which groups receive loan priority. MICROECONOMIcs, supra note
14, at 320-46. For example, it is claimed that branches make loans on the basis of "collateral"
rather than "character," thereby ignoring the small business. CBCT's and the McFadden Act,
supra note 9, at 385. To place such power in the hands of savings and loan associations may prove
detrimental to society and therefore undesirable.
17. Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects ofBranching by FinancialInstitutions on Competition,
Productive Efficiency and Stability, 1973 J.BANK RES. 154, 154-56, 298-300.
18. The total number of FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations declined from 4,471 in
September 1967 to 4,061 in September 1977, a decrease of 410. In Illinois, during this same period, the number of associations fell from 470 to 393. August FHLBB Journal, supra note 1,at 14.
(FSLIC-insured refers to savings and loan associations which are insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation. The insurance is available to both federal and state associations.)

19. Hereinafter referred to as the FHLBB. The FHLBB governs and sets rules for federally
chartered savings and loan associations.
20. August FHLBB Journal, supra note 1,at 19 (September, 1973).
21. Id. at 15.
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As a result of this line of reasoning, the FHLBB authorized
branching by federal associations in Illinois in spite of the statutory

prohibition against branches. 22 With the rise of federal savings and

loan branches in Illinois, 23 state-chartered institutions have argued the
need for greater flexibility in establishing new offices apart from the
principal business office. To deny state associations this right, it is ar-

gued, is to foster a competitive disadvantage for the state associations.
The need has been met at least in part by statutory provisions permitting the establishment of "facilities. '2 4 Facilities are offices, separate from the main office, which receive deposits; accept and issue
checks, drafts and money orders; change money; process mortgages;
and receive payments on existing indebtedness. 25 Facilities, like

branches, have been used increasingly in the

1970's.26

It is this growth of facilities as a reaction to branching by federal
associations that will be the focus of this article. The primary inquiry
will be whether the use of facilities by state associations has effectively
closed any competitive disparity with federal associations that may
have existed due to the federal savings and loan institutions' right to
branch. In considering these reactions, important clues to the future
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977) provides, in pertinent part:
No association shall establish branches or offices at which savings or investments are
regularly received or loans approved unless and to the geographic extent branch powers
and offices are granted to state banks..,
The legislative history of this statutory section is considered in detail in the text accompanying
notes 28-34 and 47-50 infra. Federal savings and loan associations are governed by the Home
Owner's Loan Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as HOLA]. Explicit
authority to approve branches by federal savings and loan associations does not appear in HOLA,
but courts that have considered this issue have construed HOLA as extending such a power. Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 16 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See
also Bridgeport Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 307 F.2d 580 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied,371 U.S. 950 (1963); First Nat'l Bank of McKeesport v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Homestead, 225 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955); North Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Kearney Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,342 U.S. 816 (1951); Central Sav. &
Loan Ass'n of Chariton v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 293 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
afy'd, 442 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp.
690 (E.D. Wis. 1957), modfiedon othergrounds, 248 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1957); Springfield Inst. for
Sav. v. Worcester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 329 Mass. 184, 107 N.E.2d 315 (1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 884 (1952).
23. In September of 1967, there were 470 FSLIC-insured savings and loan associations in
Illinois. Since this was before the FHLBB authorization of branches, there were no branches. By
September of 1977, there were 429 full branches, 32 limited facilities, and 15 satellite offices, but
the number of associations fell to 393. There were at that time 2.21 offices per association. August
FHLBB Journal, supra note 1, at 14-15. FSLIC-insured associations take in 98.25% of all gross
receipts for all operating associations. Id. at 38.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(c) (1977).
26. Nationwide, there were 773 facilities in September 1977. August FHLBB Journal, supra
note 1, at 14.
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course of branches or facilities in Illinois can be ascertained. 27
As a starting point, the state legislation of the early 1970's and the
decision by the FHLBB creating the disparity in branching powers by
federal and state associations will be considered. This will establish the
background against which the more recent legislation and judicial decisions that gave rise to increased facility use were made. The emphasis
will then shift to an analysis of the reaction to this disparity by the
legislature, courts, and Commission of Savings and Loans in Illinios,
and to the development of facilities as an answer to federal branching.
CREATION OF A PROBLEM: THE RISE OF BRANCHING BY FEDERAL
ASSOCIATIONS IN ILLINOIS

Illinois prohibits branching for its state-chartered savings and loan
associations. 28 Prior to 1971, Illinois law prohibited any savings and
loan associations from establishing any branches or offices unless similar opportunities were afforded to banks. 29 At that time, as now,

branching by banks was similarly banned. 30 The combined effect has
been to totally prohibit any branching by such financial institutions.
In 1971, the statute was amended to provide an exception to this

effective total ban by enabling the Commission of Savings and Loan
Associations 3' to adopt regulations permitting the establishment of a
facility in the case of merger or a single facility in the case of relocation. 32 This mandate was further modified to allow the operation of a

facility created by consolidation or bulk sale. 33 Thus, in the early portion of the decade, the legislature and Commissioner moved away from
a strict policy against branches. While the statutory language still ex-

pressly forbade the establishment of "branches," an approximate
equivalent could be effectuated in limited situations through the estab34
lishment of a facility.

27. See text accompanying notes 96-130 infra.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). The reason for the prohibition undoubtedly was
the traditional concept of savings and loan associations as neighborhood savings and mortgagelending institutions. Comment, supra note 8, at 657. The fears of concentration and anti-competitive effects have combined to continue the prohibition to the present.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1969).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 106 (1969) & (1977) provides, in pertinent part:
No bank shall establish or maintain more than one banking house, or receive deposits or
pay checks at any other place than such banking house, and no bank shall establish or
maintain in this or any other state of the United States any branch bank ....
31. Hereinafter referred to as Commissioner.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1973).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(c) (1975) provides:
No business shall be done at a facility except receiving deposits, cashing and issuing
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While Illinois has continued to maintain a prohibition against
branching by state-chartered associations, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board has authorized branch operations for Illinois-based federally chartered associations since 1973. 35 The authorization was based
on a study that showed "a multiplication of state approved savings and
loan banking facilities and the existence of substantial affiliate banking
operations in Illinois."'3 6 In Lyons Savings & Loan Association v. FederalHome Loan Bank Board,37 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that the proliferation of state-approved facilities created a distinct disadvantage for federal savings and
loans. 3 8 In Lyons, state savings and loan associations in Illinois challenged the FHLBB authorization of new branches by federal associations in Illinois in the face of the statutory prohibition. 39 The
associations also challenged the constitutionality of providing greater
branching powers to federal savings and loans than were available to
40
state-chartered associations.
The Lyons court followed prior decisions permitting such branching by federal associations and upheld the FHLBB authorization. The
court emphasized that the plenary discretionary powers granted the
FHLBB necessarily included the authority to approve branch applications. 4 ' Since federal regulations preempt state law, in giving the
FHLBB these plenary powers, Congress must have intended that the
FHLBB had authority to permit new branching by federal savings and
loans in Illinois. Finally, the court found that "no exact parity between
state and federal savings and loan associations is either required or necessarily intended.' ' 42 Thus, the court dismissed the contention that
checks, drafts and money orders, changing money, processing mortgages and receiving
payments on existing indebtedness.
The functional equivalence of "facilities" and "branches" is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 96-130 infra.
35. HOLA, 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See Comment, supra note 8, at 658.
36. Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 14 (N.D. Ill.
1974). The court quotes from an FHLBB memorandum entered as an exhibit in the trial. Id. at
14.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 18. The Lyons court noted that, unlike the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1976) (which tied branching policies of national banks directly into each state's laws), the HOLA
directs the FHLBB to give primary consideration to the best practices of institutions in the United
States. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970). This language, the court held, left to the FHLBB's discretion
the determination of what "best practices" are and how they ought to be implemented on a nationally uniform basis. The fact that a particular state, such as Illinois, had not adopted an
FHLBB-approved "best practice" for its state associations cannot limit the FHLBB's authority to
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branching by federal associations in Illinois created an unconstitutional
43
disparity in rights.
The decision in Lyons opened the door for branching by federal
savings and loan associations in Illinois. In so doing, the court created
a problem for the state associations. While the court had concluded
that the disparity in branching rights was not unconstitutional, 44 the
state associations were concerned that on a practical level such disparity would give an unfair competitive advantage to federal savings and
loan associations. 45 If the fears of the state associations were justified,
their federal counterparts would have a significant advantage in access
to savings dollars. There would then be the potential for state associations to either be "squeezed out" of the market or severely hampered in
46
their ability to operate.
FACILITIES: AN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM

Following Lyons, there has been scant litigation and little legislative action with regard to such branching by federal savings and loan
associations in Illinois.4 7 Reaction to the use of branches by federal
associations has come in the form of expanded use of facilities by state
associations.
In 1975, the Illinois legislature further amended the Illinois Savings and Loan Act. 48 The amended statute provided that:
No association may [shall] establish branches or offices at which savings or investments are regularly received or loans approved unless
and to the geographic extent branch powers and offices are granted to
state banks under the 'Illinois Banking Act,' as amended, or as it may
be amended or supplemented, except the Commission[er] may adopt
regulations which provide for the establishment offacilities, [a facilapprove branch offices. 377 F. Supp. at 17-18. The FHLBB's discretionary power, coupled with
the fact that states already enjoyed some power to establish facilities, convinced the court that
there was no need for parity. The court did not extend its holding to include banks, noting that
exact parity in the latter was required by law. Id.
43. 1d. at 18. Since no parity was required and the FHLBB was within its constitutional
authority in permitting branches, there was apparently no constitutional problem with the resulting disparity in branching rights.
44. Id. at 19-21.
45. Id. at 19.
46. The competitive and anti-competitive aspects of branching are discussed in Comment,
supra note 8, at 656. The issues are also considered in the text accompanying notes 113-29 infra.
47. Since Lyons, the only change to the statutory provisions concerning facilities was in ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra. The two main cases
in which Illinois courts have considered the branching and facility provisions of the statute are
Skokie Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois Sav. & Loan Bd., 61 11. App. 3d 977, 378 N.E.2d 1090
(1978) and Security Say. & Loan Ass'n of Hillsboro v. Griffin, 56 I11. App. 3d 903, 372 N.E.2d
1118 (1978).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 701-944 (1977).
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ity] as defined by the Commissioner, in the case of mergers, consolidations [a supervisory merger, consolidation] or bulk sales [sale]; or,
49
facilities [a single facility] in the case of relocations [a relocation].

The amendment effectively pluralized the provisions of the section,
thereby permitting more than one facility arising out of certain transactions such as mergers, consolidations, bulk sales, and relocations.50
Somewhat ironically, the cases challenging the amendment have
been brought by federally-chartered savings and loan associations seeking judicial determination of whether the establishment of facilities violated the existing statutory prohibition against branches and the
extent to which the Commissioner could adopt regulations providing
for the establishment of facilities.
Both of these questions were addressed in Security Savings & Loan
Association of Hillsboro v. Griffn.5 1 In that case, several federal savings
and loan associations contended that section 709(b) violated a provision of the Illinois constitution 5 2 that prohibited branch banking unless
approved by a three-fifths vote of the Illinois General Assembly. The
Illinois appellate court disagreed, noting that the statute draws a sharp
distinction between a branch and a facility. According to the court, this
interpretation of the appellant federal savings and loan associations
would "nullify the last clause in the statute giving the Commissioner
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1975). The language added by the amendment is italicized here, while the languagedeleted from the statute appears in brackets.
50. A merger is defined in the Illinois Savings and Loan Act as including consolidations. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 710.12 (1977). For purposes of this note, the two may be regarded as
equivalent. Bulk sales involve the sale of all, or nearly all, of an association's assets. In other
words, bulk sales are transactions not in the usual and regular course of business in which an
association sells all of its assets to another association in consideration of money, capital, or obligations of the purchasing association. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 820 (1977). The subtle distinctions between mergers, consolidations, and bulk sales are not important for the purposes of this
article. The importance of these transactions is that they involve the combination of two or more
separate savings and loan associations into one entity that continues the operation of the association. The Illinois statute provides:
The continuing association shall be considered the same business and corporate entity as
each merging association, with all the property, rights, powers, duties, and obligations of
each merging association.
ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 32, § 819 (1977). That is, one association is absorbed into another with one
continuing association which may operate in the two or more locations of the original institution.
Relocations differ substantially from mergers, consolidations or bulk sales; relocation accompanies a savings and loan association's decision to move its main office. When done with the approval of the Commissioner, pursuant to the statute, the association will be allowed to utilize the
original main office as a facility. Theoretically, by a series of relocations of its "main office," an
association could create an infinite number of facilities. In practice, the Commissioner can terminate any such scheme by withholding approval for continued use of the former main office.
51. 56 Ill. App. 3d 903, 372 N.E.2d 1118 (1978).
52. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8 provides:
Branch banking shall be authorized only by law approved by three-fifths (of the majority) of the members voting on the question or a majority of the members elected, whichever isgreater, in each house of the General Assembly.
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power to establish regulations for facilities. The case at bar deals with

a facility, not a branch.

53

In so holding, the court clearly enunciated the constitutionality of
the establishment of facilities. Perhaps more importantly, the court
demonstrated that facilities were to be distinguished from branches.
This cleared the way for expanding the use of facilities without violat-

ing the branching laws, even as facilities began to approximate
branches.
Having affirmed the constitutionality of facilities, the Griffin court
went on to consider the extent of the Commissioner's power to adopt
regulations pertaining to those facilities. The plaintiff, Security Savings
& Loan of Hillsboro, argued that section 709(b) permitted an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Commissioner. The court disagreed, holding the delegation to the Commissioner of authority to
regulate facilities was reasonable and constitutional. 54 The court stated
that "[t]he rule is that the courts will not interfere with the exercise of
the legislatively created powers of an administrative agency absent a
showing that the agency's actions were palpably arbitrary, unreasona55
ble or capricious.
The same belief was clearly enunciated in Skokie FederalSavings
& Loan Association v. Illinois Savings & Loan Board.56 Analogizing to
the legislative authorization of power to the Director of Insurance discussed in Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 57 the court concluded
that section 709(b) complied with the necessary criteria for the delegation of authority 58 and that such legislative delegation to the Commis59
sion to adopt regulations for facilities was proper.
53. 56 I11.
App. 3d 903, 912-13, 372 N.E.2d 1118, 1125 (1978). This position was reaffirmed in
Skokie Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois Sav. & Loan Bd., 61 111. App. 3d 977, 378 N.E.2d 1090
(1978).
54. 56 Ill. App. 3d at 913, 372 N.E.2d at 1125. See note 59 infra.
55. Id citing Skokie Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois Sav. & Loan Bd., 88 Il.App. 2d 373,
379, 232 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1967).
56. 61 111. App. 3d 977, 378 N.E.2d 1090 (1978).
57. 68 11.2d 361, 369 N.E.2d 875 (1977).
58. 61 111. App. 3d at 984-85, 378 N.E.2d at 1095-96.
59. Id. at 985, 378 N.E.2d at 1096. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Stofer, examined the
present complexity of government, noting that to require the legislature to delineate all
2d 361, 372-73, 369 N.E.2d at 879.
permissable actions would result in hopeless inefficiency. 68 I11.
Thus, as a general principle, administrative agencies are created by the state to carry out the will
of the state as expressed by the General Assembly. The powers exercised by such administrative
agencies and their officers derive solely from the statute. I ILL. LAW & PRACTICE, Administrative
Law §§ 2, 21 (1953). In the case of savings and loans, the Commissioner and the Illinois Savings
and Loan Board derive their power from the Illinois Savings and Loan Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
32, §§ 701-944 (1977). These powers include the implied power to do what is reasonably necessary
to execute their duties. As such, the Illinois General Assembly has delegated some discretionary
power to adopt rules and regulations to carry out the duties imposed on administrative agencies
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Given that the statute permitting the establishment of facilities is
constitutional and that the authority to prescribe regulations regarding
the establishment of facilities properly lies with the Commissioner, section 709(b) still limits the means by which facilities may be established
to mergers, consolidations, bulk sales, or relocations. 60 Furthermore, the Savings and Loan Act provides that the Commissioner
shall not approve a change in the location of an association's business
office or the establishment of an additional office unless a need exists
for an association in the proposed area of operation and if the facility
6
can be maintained without undue injury to existing associations. '
These limitations were considered by the court in Skokie Federal.
Five cases were consolidated for appeal to challenge the constitutional
aspects of the statute and the Commissioner's authority. Additionally,
in each case, objections to relocation by state-chartered savings and
loan associations and the Commissioner's specific factual determina62
tion were raised.
In one of the five consolidated actions, the court considered certain
aspects of relocation pursuant to the statute. In its suit, Skokie Federal
maintained that requests by two state savings and loan associations to
relocate to an area near Skokie Federal were mere subterfuges, lacking
in substance, used as a guise to allow the other two associations to expand their operations in contravention of the prohibition against
branch banking. Neither of the state savings and loan associations had
sufficient assets to carry forward a relocation. Consequently, there
63
could have been no intent on the part of either actually to relocate.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that an actual
intent to relocate was not required by the statute 64 where the ultimate
result contemplated was a merger, consolidation, or bulk sale.65 Therefore, the court said, the intent of the associations was not controlling
and the relocations were allowed. 6 6 In the same action, the court reby law. 1 ILL. LAW & PR.ACTICE, Administrative Law §§ 22, 24 (1953). Administrative rulemaking
is not unrestrained. The courts have required that the legislature, in delegating power, provide
sufficient identification of: "(I) The persons and activities potentially subject to regulation; (2) the
harm sought to be prevented; and (3) the general means intended to be available to the administrator to prevent the identified harm." 68 Ill. 2d at 372, 369 N.E.2d at 879. It has been held that
section 709(b) complies with these criteria. 61 11. App. 3d at 985, 378 N.E.2d at 1096.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 724, 744(h) (1977).
62. Skokie Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois Sav. & Loan Bd., 61 111. App. 3d 977, 990-91,
378 N.E.2d 1090, 1100 (1978).
63. Id. at 988, 378 N.E.2d at 1098.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).
65. 61 111. App. 3d at 988, 378 N.E.2d at 1098.
66. Id.
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fused to apply the restrictive interpretation that section 709(b) was to
be utilized only in cases where an association sought to remove its prin67
cipal business office from an economically declining area.
The court appears to have held that a savings and loan association
may add a facility even when there is no intent to relocate its main
office. Apparently, the court would permit such a move even if it is not
dictated by the economics of a declining area. This suggests that the
court is adopting a more expansive view and will in the future be more
receptive when considering whether the reason for a requested change
in location is sufficient.
In analyzing the various factual situations presented by the consolidated cases, the Skokie Federalcourt considered Section 744(h) of the
Illinois Savings and Loan Act. 68 The actions involved relocations of
offices authorized by the Commissioner pursuant to mergers or bulk
sales of assets from one state savings and loan to another state association. The plaintiffs' common objection was that no need existed for
another savings and loan association in the area planned for relocation.
The federal associations asserted that these new facilities would cause
undue injury to existing financial institutions in the area since support
for such existing institutions would be eroded by the presence of another facility. 6 9 Should this occur, the facility would violate the provisions of section 744(h). 70 The state-chartered savings and loans denied
that their presence in the areas of relocation would cause injury. The
court pointed out that the factual situations were susceptible of varying
determinations. 7 1 Within this context, the Commissioner's administrative determination of fact represented an expert judgment not readily
measurable by precise judicial standards. As a result, the court held
that the findings of the Commissioner would not be reversed unless the
record fails to support the conclusions. 72 The court held that reasonable competition is to be encouraged in order to better serve the public
interest of the locale. 7 3 In light of these two considerations, the court
74
upheld all five relocations.
67. Id.
68. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
69. 61 111. App. 3d at 988-98, 378 N.E.2d at 1098-1106.
70. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
71. 61 111. App. 3d at 997, 378 N.E.2d at 1104. In one of the combined actions, two expert
witnesses considered the factual situation and "reached opposite determinations concerning need
and undue injury based on. . . analysis of the matter." Id. at 997, 378 N.E.2d at 1101.
72. Id at 991, 378 N.E.2d at 1100, citing Skokie Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Becker, 26 I1. 2d
76, 185 N.E.2d 861 (1962).
73. 61 111. App. 3d at 998, 378 N.E.2d at 1105.
74. Id. at 998, 378 N.E.2d at 1106.
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It is apparent that in the four years since Lyons there has been a
gradual trend in both the legislature and the judiciary to permit more
than one place of business for state-chartered savings and loan associations.75 The 1975 legislative amendment to section 709(b) had the effect of expanding the number of permissible facilities from one to an
unlimited number if established by way of mergers, consolidations, or
bulk sales transactions. 76 Additionally, the requirement that such
transactions be "supervisory" was dropped. 77 The term "supervisory"
had been susceptible to the interpretation that mergers were only permitted for financially unstable institutions. 7 8 This combination of
changes led the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, in Skokie
Federal,to conclude that the statutory amendments "substantially lessened the restrictions on the expansion of state-chartered associa79
tions."
While the potential for the proliferation of facilities is limitless, the
fact that establishment of facilities is restricted to mergers, consolidations, and bulk sales effectively limits the practical ability to acquire
new facilities. However, the legislature provided considerable incentive for state savings and loans to merge. In 1975, the Illinois General
Assembly passed legislation requiring all savings and loan associations
to obtain insurance on their withdrawable capital accounts. 80 In Security Savings & Loan Association of Hillsboro v. Griffln, 81 the court stated,
"Many smaller savings and loans. . . were unable to afford such insurance and were left with two alternatives-merge with a larger institution capable of meeting the criteria for obtaining insurance of accounts,
'8 2
or liquidate.
As a practical matter, the limitation on facilities does not impose
as great a restriction as it might seem. The reason is simply that those
75. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1970); Skokie Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois
Sav. & Loan Bd., 61 111. App. 3d 977, 378 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Security Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Hillsboro v. Griffin, 56 Il. App. 3d 903, 372 N.E.2d 1118 (1978).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1975).

77. Id.
78. 61 111. App. 3d at 989, 378 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
79. Id. at 984, 378 N.E.2d at 1095.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 711 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
An association operating under this Act shall, before June 30, 1975, obtain and maintain
insurance of the association's withdrawable capital by an insurance corporation. . . in
an amount at least equal to that provided by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation.
"Insurance corporation" is defined as: "The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, or
such other instrumentality of or corporation chartered by the United States." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
32, § 710.10 (1977).
81. 56 Ill. App. 3d 903, 372 N.E.2d 1118 (1978).
82. 56 Ill.
App. 3d at 905, 372 N.E.2d at 1120.
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associations that would have a difficult time initiating a merger to gain
a facility are those least inclined to do so while associations that desire
additional facilities are generally in a better position to establish
them. 83 The small "neighborhood" association 84 has a well defined
market area and, as a general proposition, would appear unlikely to
need additional facilities. Also, the small association probably lacks
the necessary capital or leverage to attempt to enter a new market
85
area.
Larger associations with more extensive market areas might well
benefit by establishing additional facilities. They are better able to accomplish the establishment of facilities through merger, consolidation,
or bulk sale because they are more likely to have sufficient capital for
the acquisition of a facility 86 through a bulk purchase of assets of another association. Merging does require a willing "mergee," and the
fact that an association desires to merge or consolidate does not guarantee that this desire will be satisfied. 87 Again, the statutory "persua-

sion" applied to savings and loan associations by requiring insurance
on capital accounts makes the accomplishment of merger easier. 88
The establishment of facilities can be done without merger, consolidation, or bulk sale if effectuated properly through the process of
relocation. 89 In such a case, the association may be allowed to maintain the original office as a facility. While such relocations are, of
83. There are of course exceptions to this proposition, but as the textual analysis indicates,
reality supports this general conclusion. See text accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
84. "Historically, savings and loan associations have developed from local, neighborhood
foundations." Comment, supra note 8, at 667. The Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 itself provides that savings and loan associations are to be established "[iln order to provide local mutual
thrift institutions in which people may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing
of homes. . .. ." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
85. In downstate areas in particular, where the population density is much lower, associations serve more clearly defined markets and assets of those associations necessarily are less than
those of institutions in more heavily populated areas. These smaller associations are less likely to
merge or be in a position to acquire another location through bulk purchases. Also, the establishment of a facility in a new area is much less likely to be needed and more likely to cause injury to
existing associations. In such a case, the limitations of section 744(h) would act to prohibit a
relocation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 744(h) (1977).
86. By definition, larger associations have more assets than smaller associations. As a result,
they can make more loans and, even if the rate of return on money lent is the same for large and
small associations, the larger association will generate greater gross profits. This leaves the association in a better position to engage in a bulk purchase of another association's assets, or to exert
leverage in effecting a merger.
87. There may be no institutions that desire to be such a "mergee." Therefore, there is no
guarantee that a merger can be effectuated.
88. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 711 (1977). See note 80 supra.
89. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). A relocation, here, occurs when an association wishes to transfer its principal office to a new locale. Relocation represents a specific statutory
procedure for establishing a facility and is to be distinguished from relocation in a generic sense
which might be interpreted to include moves made in connection with a merger or consolidation.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

course, subject to the limitations that they must not cause injury to existing associations in the area of relocation, this process does provide a
means of circumventing the merger, consolidation, or bulk sale route
used to obtain an additional operating location. These combined factors indicate that the statutory limitations on new facilities, while restricting the situations under which facilities can be established, do not,
in practice, prevent the establishment of facilities. 90
Furthermore, permeating all of these considerations is the fact that
judicial decisions have indicated a reluctance on the part of the courts
to interfere with the Commissioner's regulation of facilities. 9' As a result, the Commissioner is left with substantial discretion in adopting
these regulations and in making factual determinations of whether savings and loan institutions meet the requirements of the regulations.
Typically, the Commissioner is a strong advocate for allowing the maximum amount of activity by savings and loan associations and facilities
92
in advancing the purposes enunciated in the Savings and Loan Act.
A potentially injurious disparity had been created for state savings
and loan associations by the FHLBB authorization of branches by federal associations and the subsequent judicial approval of such branches
in Lyons.9 3 Since that time, the legislature and courts have closed the
competitive gap created by the disparity in branching rights by advancing more liberal rules for the establishment of facilities. 94 It is apparent, however, that the legislature has determinedly avoided permitting
branches per se for state associations. 95

90. In fact, the legislative incentives to merge, the broad discretionary powers given the Commissioner, the lack of judicial interference, the economic realities, and the potential for statutory
relocation do much to erode the obstructions to establishing a facility.
91. Skokie Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois Sav. & Loan Bd., 61 111. App. 3d 977, 378
N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Hillsboro v. Griffin, 56 Ill. App. 3d 903, 372
N.E.2d 1118 (1978).
92. Without facilities for state savings and loans, federal associations could gain a competitive advantage through branches. See text accompanying notes 22-23 and 44-46 supra. This, of
course, would be detrimental to state institutions. Hence, the Commissioner's strong advocacy
position. It should be noted that there is a self-preservation motivation for the Commissioner. If
federal associations gain a significant competitive advantage, the number of state associations
would probably decline as they converted to federal associations. This would in turn decrease the
extent of the Commissioner's jurisdiction, and represent an evaporation of his power base. See
Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Hillsboro v. Griffin, 56 Ill. App. 3d 903, 912-13, 372 N.E.2d 1118,
1125 (1978).
93. 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
94. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1975) & (1977).
95. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).
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ANALYSIS: THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE OF FACILITIES AND
BRANCHES

Perhaps the most tenable explanation for the legislature's failure to
permit branching is that facilities have accomplished the same objectives for state savings and loan associations as branches have for federal associations. Arguably, the need for branching by state
associations has been eliminated by the increase of facilities, and the
necessary pressures to effectuate a statutory change have simply not
been present. 96
The question then becomes: Is a facility the functional equivalent
of a branch? 97 If facilities are equivalent to branches, then the argument concerning competitive advantages and disadvantages arising
from disparities in branching rights becomes largely irrelevant, as does
98
the need for any statutory revision to permit branches.
As an initial step, it must be determined whether facilities meet the
criteria established in the general definition of a branch as set out in the
introduction.9 9 A facility, like a branch, is a separate physical entity
which is united in a legal sense to the main office. It has no separate
board of directors or capital structure, operating instead as an instrumentality of the principal business office of the savings and loan association. 1°° Thus, in a very general sense, facilities and branches are
identical. Of greater significance is an inquiry into whether facilities
and branches, in a practical sense, operate in the same way.
96. See text accompanying notes 97-130 infra.
97. Illinois is unique among large states in its prohibition of branching. A survey of six other
large industrial states, where the combined savings at savings and loan associations, when included with those in Illinois, total 53% of the total of all savings at savings and loan associations
nationwide, reveals that all of them allow branching by state savings and loan associations. See
CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 6000-10 (West) (1968); FLA. STAT. § 665.441 (Supp. 1973); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 17:12B-25 (1963); 4 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 396 (McKinney) (1970); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1111.03 (Page) (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 902 (Purdon) (1965). The result is that, in states
comparable to Illinois, one never reaches the question of whether a facility is equivalent to a
branch. In the six states that permit branching by state savings and loan associations, 7 1%of the
savings at savings and loan associations are located at branch offices. In Illinois, where state
association branches are prohibited, only 23% of these savings are located at branch offices. August FHLBB Journal, supra note i, at 14.
98. In establishing the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970), Congress responded to
branching by state banks. The Act gave authority to national banks to branch in the manner
prescribed by state law. This, Congress reasoned, would establish competitive equality. Wolfson
& Stevens, You Can Bank On It: An Anaosis of JudicialBranch Bank Characterizationand an
Alternative Proposal,5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 389, 392-94 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
Wolfson & Stevens]. The situation is analagous for savings and loan associations. If state and
federal associations can establish remote offices that perform the same functions, then there will be
competitive equality no matter what label is given to such offices.
99. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). See generally Ill. Sav. & Loan Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, §§ 701-09 (1977).
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It has been suggested that the best means of analyzing whether a
facility qualifies as a branch, or in this case whether a facility is
equivalent to a branch, is to apply a functional test.' 0 ' Under such an
approach, the focus is on the traditional banking functions performed
by the facility. Under the Illinois Savings and Loan Act, facilities are
permitted to receive deposits; cash and issue checks, drafts, and money
orders; change money; process mortgages; and receive money on indebtedness. 0 2 It is evident from this list of permissible functions that
the typical day-to-day operational functions of a savings and loan association can be carried on at a facility. Absent from the list are only the
more involved major transactions. 0 3 These more complex transactions
04
are few in number compared to the permissible functions. 1
No definition of branches is provided by Illinois statute since
branching is prohibited. Similarly, under HOLA, there is no statement
as to what constitutes a branch. 105 As a result of this lack of any definitive statement on what constitutes a branch, branches may take on a
variety of forms and functions. Interpretations of the National Bank
Act 10 6 have included under the definition of "branch" any place for
receiving deposits or cashing checks or lending money apart from the
chartered premises.107 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held in Illinois ex rel Lignoul v. ContinentalIll
Nat'? Bank & Trust Co. 108 that an off-premises electronic bank facility
101. Wolfson & Stevens, supra note 98, at 423, 428. The Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District similarly indicated that branching should be viewed from a functional standpoint:
"The Commissioner has quite properly defined a facility in terms of its function and not in terms
of its physical description." Security Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 56 I11.App. 3d 903, 372 N.E.2d
1118 (1978). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the functional analysis in
considering branches. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(c) (1977).
103. The two most important functions of a savings and loan association historically have
been savings, and mortgage loans. See note 84 supra. The statute specifically permits facilities to
receive deposits, process mortgages, and receive money on indebtedness. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 709(c) (1977). It would appear that the only operations which would not be permitted under the
statute would be such transactions as initial processing of specialized accounts such as escrow and
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA accounts). However, even with these transactions, once the
accounts are opened, it would appear that the normal day-to-day activities involving these accounts could be handled by the facilities, since receipts and deposits, as well as payment on loans
are permitted functions at facilities. Id. See text accompanying notes 106-07 infra.
104. In the case of a savings or checking account, for instance after the initial "complex"
transaction of opening the account that would be performed at the main office, literally thousands
of normal transactions might be handled at the facility.
105. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1976).
106. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
107. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 135 (1969); Dakota Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 554 F.2d 345, 352 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
108. 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
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where customers could deposit and withdraw money, cash checks, and
make payments on loans was a branch. 10 9
Facilities, then, appear to meet the minimum definition of
branches. As such, facilities may perform exactly the same functions,
or even more functions than a branch. Admittedly, these are only minimum standards. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where branches
are performing all of the potential banking services, there will not be an
exact equivalence. Two important factors suggest that any such discrepancy is not critical. First, one of the important aspects to be examined under the functional test is the way in which the individual
customer perceives the nature and function of a branch or facility.110
Here, given the great overlap in functions and the fact that the most
numerous and common transactions, specifically savings deposits,
check-cashing as well as loan-processing and payment, can be handled
at a facility, it is likely that the average customer perceives facilities and
branches as being equivalent. Secondly, and more importantly, facilities and branches are both used to advance the goal of customer oriented service, through which savings institutions hope to realize the
ultimate goal of cultivating new savings dollars. In providing better
service and in taking-in savings dollars, the facility, with its ability to
perform the normal day-to-day operations, is as effective as a branch in
achieving the associations' aims. Thus, from a functional standpoint, a
facility must be regarded as equivalent to a branch.
While it appears that facilities are equivalent to branches in many,
or most, cases, several questions still remain unanswered. First, if facilities and branches are in effect identical, why do the courts, as did the
Illinois appellate court in Security Savings & Loan Association of Hillsboro v. Groin," 1 distinguish between them? The obvious answer is
that the Illinois statute prohibits branching by savings and loan associations. If facilities were equated with branches, they would be violative of the statute. It is apparent that in order to preserve facilities,
the court had to differentiate between facilities and branches. The distinction does not represent a belief that the two are somehow fundamentally different as much as it signifies a willingness on the part of the
judiciary to permit facilities as a response to branching.
At this juncture, a second question arises: Why not simply allow
branching for state associations? The answer requires a reconsidera109. Id. at 177.
110. Wolfson & Stevens, supra note 98, at 428.
111. 56 Il. App. 3d 903, 912, 372 N.E.2d 1118, 1125 (1978).
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tion of competition, not only between savings and loan associations,
but also between savings and loans and other financial intermediaries,
namely banks. This, in turn, involves an analysis of the forces that
might bring about a change.
Where a disparity in branching rights exists, there is pressure by
those with fewer rights to equalize the rights so that they will be able to
compete effectively. 12 Once the gap is closed, the pressures for change
subside. Where, as in Illinois, facilities closely approximate branches,
any tendency to exert pressure to obtain greater branching rights is
largely eliminated. In initially authorizing branches for federal associations, 13 the FHLBB expressed concern that facilities were giving
state associations a competitive advantage. Sensing a disparity in
rights, the FHLBB reacted to increase the ability of its member associations to have more than one location for business. The rise of branches
apparently tipped the scales the other way, giving the federal associations a competitive edge. Again, there was pressure for change and the
response was to cut back restrictions on facilities."14 As facilities were
increasingly used by state associations, any competitive advantage that
federal associations may have enjoyed was largely neutralized. The
court, in Skokie Federal,recognized this and refused to find facilities
unconstitutional because of alleged differences in abilities to establish
more than one office. 1 5 As a result, there is presently no significant
propensity for change.
If a change were to be made in the existing prohibition on branching by associations, it would necessarily affect the rights of banks. The
reason is that, historically, the statutory provisions for branching by
savings and loan associations have been linked to the provisions for
banks.1 6 Section 709(b) provides that "[n]o association may establish
branches or offices . . .unless, and to the geographical extent . . .
branch powers and offices are granted to state banks."" I7 To permit
state savings and loan associations to branch would require one of two
approaches. The legislature either could allow section 709(b) to stand
as it is and change the bank statutes to permit branching or it could
amend section 709(b) to permit savings and loan associations to
112.

L. RITTER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS at

381 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as RITTER & SILBERI.

113. On January 12, 1973, the FHLBB voted to allow federal associations to apply for branching permits. 377 F. Supp. 11, 14 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See note 22 supra.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977). See text accompanying notes 35-50 supra.
115. 61 111. App. 3d 977, 378 N.E.2d 1090 (1978).
116.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1977).

117. Id.
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branch, while maintaining the prohibition against branches for banks.
In short, drop the link between savings and loan provisions and bank
statutory provisions.
Neither alternative is likely to be adopted by the Illinois legislature. Under the first alternative, state savings and loan associations
would be given little if any new advantage. In large measure, the only
change would be in renaming facilities as branches. Banks in Illinois
are also presently allowed to maintain two facilities under the statutes. 18 These facilities are subject to fairly significant limitations. "19
The imposition of such limitations would probably mean that the facility would only meet the bare minimum requirements of a branch, and
might not be equivalent to many branches which are permitted extensive geographic and functional rights. In meeting the minimum requirements for branches, however, it is possible that the facility will
approximate some branches. 120 If that is the case, there is again little
incentive to effect a legislative change. If bank facilities are not
equivalent to savings and loan facilities or branches, so that permissible
branching would give banks increased rights, the potential problems
created by permitting them to branch would seem to outweigh any advantages.
Unlike federal savings and loan associations, branching policies
for federal banks are tied to state policies.' 2' As a result, federal banks
have exactly the same branching limitations as state banks have. If
state banks were to be suddenly granted branching rights, this could
create a disparity in branching rights-among banks which could lead to
competitive inequality. This, in turn, would force federal banks operating in Illinois to branch. 2 2 Such a result may be desirable, 23 but it
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 105(15) (1977).
119. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) No facility shall be more than 3500 yards from the main banking premises of the
maintaining bank; and if 2 facilities are maintained at least one of the facilities shall be
1500 feet or less from the main premises of the maintaining bank.
(b) No facility shall be closer than 600 feet to any then existing main banking premises. . . (certain exceptions are enumerated).
(c) Not more than 2 facilities shall be established or maintained by a bank at any one
time ....

120. See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
121. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
122. RITrER & SILBER, supra note 112 at 379-81. The authors argue that there are too many
small banks and that the public would be better served if there were fewer banks, with more of
them close to the optimum size. The optimum size is larger than the size of most present banks.
The reason that the banking industry is not operating at its optimum size, say the authors, is
antibranching statutes:
Apparently there is only one realistic way to initiate meaningful change in this area, and
that is by removing federal deference to state branching statutes-permitting federally
chartered banks, in other words, to branch over a specified area regardless of state law.
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seems unlikely that the legislature would effectuate such a change, unless a careful study on the merits indicated a need by state and federal
banks to branch. Certainly, a change in bank branching laws will not
come about as a response to state savings and loan associations' desire
to have branches instead of facilities.
The second alternative-permitting branches for state savings and
loan associations while maintaining the prohibition against branches
for banks--creates similar problems. In particular, if the link between
savings and loan associations and banking institutions is eliminated,
the door is opened for the creation of competitive disparities which
24
may be detrimental.
Some final observations are necessary to put these considerations
into proper perspective. Savings and loan associations and banks originally were designed to serve essentially separate functions. The primary purposes of associations were to make mortgage loans and to
accept savings deposits. 25 Banks, on the other hand, provided some
additional functions-commercial loans and checking accounts are two
of the more common examples. While the distinction between savings
and loans and bank functions have been blurred, 26 to the extent that
the distinction remains, the arguments about competitive disparities
arising from different branching rights become largely irrelevant, since
savings and loan associations and banks do not directly compete in
these areas.
Admittedly, the two intermediaries do compete for savings dollars.
Branching, however, is only one of many ways to achieve a customeroriented service which attracts savings. In fact, other methods may be
more effective. Longer banking hours, Negotiable Order of WithUnder such competitive pressures, the states can be expected to accelerate the granting of
similar rights to institutions chartered by themselves. Id. at 381.
The same pressures would work in reverse if state associations were permitted to branch.
123. Id.
124. Once the link between savings and loan associations and banks is gone, it is at least
theoretically possible that one or the other of the financial intermediaries might eventually be
authorized to engage in activities in which the other one cannot engage. In such a case, the disparity of rights would again establish competitive advantages and disadvantages, some of which may
not be acceptable.
125. Comment, supra note 8, at 667.
126. The blurring of the distinctions between savings and loan associations and banks is in
part a result of savings and loans expanding upon their traditional roles of providing savings and
house mortgages. As savings and loans have catered to customers by providing Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA), Keough plans, Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts (see note 127
infra), and making loans on non-residential buildings, they have necessarily moved into areas in
which banks also operate. There has been in short, an increased overlapping of services provided
by banks and savings and loan associations.
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drawal accounts, 1 2 7 free gifts, and new provisions which effectively allow interest on checking accounts 28 are all methods of competing for
savings dollars which render the use of branches much less important.
Further, access to savings dollars can perhaps be better accomplished through methods such as mobile savings units, satellite facilities, and computer terminals placed in convenient areas for transacting
banking business. Certainly, these methods bring the savings and loan
closer to the customers and their assets and make banking easier for
savers. 129
From an overall perspective, then, the forces necessary to bring
about branching for state savings and loan associations simply do not
exist. It is much more likely that pressure will be exerted to expand the
functions that may be performed by facilities and to permit the use of
30
satellite facilities, mobile units, and computer terminals.
CONCLUSION

The problem of competitive disadvantage which confronted state
savings and loan associations after the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board authorization of branches by federal associations, and approval
of such authorization in Lyons Savings & Loan Association v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board,has been answered in large part by the development of facilities for state-chartered savings and loan associations.
Statutory amendments, making easier the creation of facilities, and judicial decisions supporting competition and conferring broad discretionary powers upon the Commissioner of Savings and Loans in I11i127. Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts, commonly referred to as NOW accounts, operate much like checking accounts: "withdrawal is made by negotiable instrument, which, similar
to a check, could be delivered to third parties in payment of debts." Comment, Banking LawNew York State Savings Are Without Authority to Offer Negotiable Order of Withdrawl "NOW"
Accounts, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1044, 1045 (1975).

128. When a person writes a check, the amount needed to cover the check is transferred from
the savings account to the checking account. This arrangement allows one to keep a greater portion of savings in interest earning savings accounts instead of non-interest earning checking accounts, while still retaining the benefits of a checking account.
129. By establishing satellite offices in hospitals or shopping malls, or by installing computer
banking terminals in such places, or even in the home, banking would be made extremely convenient for customers. The point is that these methods can be more effective than facilities or
branches in reaching out for the limited savings dollars in the hands of the public. For a discussion of computer banking terminals, see Wolfson & Stevens, supra note 98, at 391.
130. One open question remains: Will the use of facilities and branches result in greater competition and lower prices, or will the present trend of concentration in associations reach a stage
where monopoly power can be exerted in the marketplace? The answer is difficult to foresee at
this point. While concentration is occurring, some will argue (see note 110 supra) that such concentration may be beneficial in that it helps financial institutions to attain their economically
optimum size.
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nois, have led to the functional equivalence of facilities and branches.
Now that the "competitive gap" arising out of a disparity in branching
powers has effectively been closed, there is little incentive to permit
branching for state associations. Specifically, in Illinois, the rise of facilities has restored the branching issue to a position of relative equilibrium. Unless other pressures or forces arise, there is little likelihood of
a dramatic change from the equilibrium position.
Real pressures do exist, however, to expand the rights and activities of facilities, and to permit satellite and mobile units and computer
terminals to transact business. In theory, such pressure will ultimately
lead to legislative changes to permit the use of such equipment. It
would appear that it is in this area that the energies of savings and loan
associations and the legislature are likely to be focused. If change occurs, it most likely will be in the form of expanded services that facilities may perform. As for the branching issue itself, it has become
largely redundant and unimportant.
JAY LUNDBORG

